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Abstract Proportional representation (PR) is one of the central principles in vot-
ing. Elegant rules with compelling PR axiomatic properties have the potential to be
adopted for several important collective decision making settings. I survey some re-
cent ideas and results on axioms and rules for proportional representation in commit-
tee voting.
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1 Introduction
When making collective decisions, fairness entails that the decision is made in accor-
dance with the will and desire of the people and that each person has equal influence.
A natural principle that captures this requirement is proportional representation: the
bigger a group, the more representation it should have. This general principle of pro-
portionality is engrained in just societies.1
We discuss the issue of proportional representation in the context of approval-
based committee voting (also called multi-winner voting with approvals). The setting
involves a set N = {1, . . . , n} of voters and a set C of candidates. Each voter i ∈ N
submits an approval ballot Ai ⊆ C, which represents the subset of candidates that
she approves. We refer to the list A = (A1, . . . , An) of approval ballots as the ballot
Haris Aziz
Data61, CSIRO and UNSW Sydney, Australia
Tel.: +61-2-9490 59090
Fax: +61-2-8306 0405
E-mail: haris.aziz@data61.csiro.au
1 Aristotle said “[...]what the just is-the proportional; the unjust is what violates the proportion.” (Nico-
machean Ethics, Written 350 B.C).
2 Haris Aziz
profile. Based on the approval of the voters, the goal is to select a target k number of
candidates.
The setting has inspired a number of natural voting rules (see e.g. the survey by
Kilgour (2010)). Many of the voting rules are designed with the goal of achieving
some form of just representation. However it is not entirely obvious what axiom
captures proportional representation requirements.
How should proportional representation be defined in approval-based committee
voting?We first note that it can be defined in a straightforward manner for a restricted
version of approval-based committee voting that we will refer to as ‘polarized’. In a
polarised profile, voters can be partitioned into disjoint groups such that the approvals
of voters in the same group coincide, and approvals from two different groups do not
intersect. For polarized preferences, the proportional representation requirement can
easily be formalized as follows: for any group G that approves candidates in set CG,
we can require that at least min(⌊k
|G|
n
⌋, |CG|) candidates from CG are selected. Not
only can the requirement be easily defined, it can also achieved by the following rule:
GroupSeqPAV: Sequentially select candidates to be placed in the committee.
In each round, consider the group G that has the largest value |G|/(r(G) + 1)
(where r(G) is the current number of representatives of G) and still has an
approved candidate c that is yet not selected. Place c in the committee. Repeat
until k candidates are selected.
Polarized preferences are typically prevalent in ‘closed list’ party elections in
which voters vote for parties and each party gets seats in proportion of votes (Janson,
2016). These seats are then filled up by representatives from the corresponding party.
If each party has sufficient number of representatives, then the problem reduces to
giving each party at least the integer part of the target quota and then apportion the
remaining seats (see e.g., Brill et al., 2017b; Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2016). There
are several ways to do this and there is a substantial body of work on proportional
representation via apportionment (see e.g., Balinski and Young, 2001; Pukelsheim,
2014; Petit and Terouanne, 1990). In this restricted setting that models ‘closed list’
party elections, GroupSeqPAV corresponds to the DHondt method (also called the
Jefferson method) for apportionment.
Representation becomes more challenging to formalize when voters in a group
may approve candidates approved by voters outside the group. The challenge stems
from the fact that the approval-based committee voting setting does not even assume
pre-specified groups since each individual voter is free to approve any subset of can-
didates. In what follows we describe recent work on formalising proportional repre-
sentation axioms that are referred to as justified representation axioms.
2 Justified Representation Properties
We present justified representation axioms that are all based on the proportionality
representation principle. The idea behind all the axioms is that a cohesive and large
enough group of voters deserves sufficient number of approved candidates in the
winning set of candidates.
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Definition 1 (Justified representation (JR)) Given a ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An)
over a candidate set C and a target committee size k, we say that a set of candidates
W of size |W | = k satisfies justified representation for (A, k) if ∀X ⊆ N : |X| ≥
n
k
and | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ 1 =⇒ (|W ∩ (∪i∈XAi)| ≥ 1). JR was proposed by Aziz et al.
(2015a, 2017a).
The rationale behind JR is that if k candidates are to be selected, then, intuitively,
each group of n
k
voters “deserves” a representative. Therefore, a set of n
k
voters that
have at least one candidate in common should not be completely unrepresented. JR
can be strengthened to PJR and EJR.
Definition 2 (Proportional Justified Representation (PJR)) Given a ballot profile
(A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C, a target committee size k, k ≤ m, and integer ℓ
we say that a set of candidatesW, |W | = k, satisfies ℓ-proportional justified represen-
tation for (A, k) if ∀X ⊆ N : |X| ≥ ℓ n
k
and | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ ℓ =⇒ (|W ∩ (∪i∈XAi)| ≥ ℓ).
We say that W satisfies proportional justified representation for (A, k) if it satis-
fies ℓ-proportional justified representation for (A, k) and all integers ℓ ≤ k. PJR was
formally studied by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (2017b).
Definition 3 (Extended justified representation (EJR)) Given a ballot profile
(A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C, a target committee size k, k ≤ m, we say that
a set of candidatesW, |W | = k, satisfies ℓ-extended justified representation for (A, k)
and integer ℓ if ∀X ⊆ N : |X| ≥ ℓ n
k
and | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ ℓ =⇒ (∃i ∈ X : |W ∩ Ai| ≥ ℓ).
We say that W satisfies extended justified representation for (A, k) if it satisfies
ℓ-extended justified representation for (A, k) and all integers ℓ ≤ k. EJRwas proposed
by Aziz et al. (2017a).
It is easy to observe the following relations: EJR =⇒ PJR =⇒ JR. Also note
that if we only consider ℓ = 1 in the definitions of PJR, and EJR we get JR. We also
observe that for k = 1, JR, PJR, and EJR are equivalent.
3 Achieving Proportional Representation
We say that a rule satisfies JR/PJR/EJR if it always returns a committee satisfying
the corresponding property. For preferences that are not polarized, the definition of
GroupSeqPAV needs to be extended since there are no clear-cut groups for general
approval ballots. One such generalisation is called SeqPAV. Let H be a function de-
fined on integers such that H(p) = 0 for p = 0 and H(p) =
∑p
j=1
1
j
otherwise. Let the
PAV score of a committeeW be
∑
i∈N H(|W ∩Ai|). Then the SeqPAV rule is defined as
follows.
SeqPAV: Set W = ∅. Then in round j, j = 1, . . . , k, add a new candidate to W
so that the PAV score ofW is maximised.
SeqPAV was originally proposed by Thiele (1895). Although SeqPAV seems like
a reasonable extension of GroupSeqPAV, it has been shown that SeqPAV does not
even satisfy JR (Aziz et al., 2017a). Incidentally, SeqPAV is not the only rule that
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may violate JR. Aziz et al. (2017a) pointed out that several well-known rules that are
designed for representation purposes fail to satisfy JR.2
Whereas SeqPAV iteratively builds a committee while trying to maximize the PAV
score, one could also try to find a committee that globally maximizes the PAV score.
Such a rule is popularly known as PAV and was originally proposed by Thiele (1895).
In contrast to SeqPAV, PAV always returns a committee that satisfies EJR (Aziz et al.,
2017a) thereby giving a constructive argument for the existence of a committee that
satisfies EJR. Although PAV satisfies EJR, it does have some drawbacks. From a
computational perspective, finding a PAV outcome is NP-hard Aziz et al. (2015b);
Skowron et al. (2016). The computational intractability renders the rule impractical
for large scale voting. From an axiomatic perspective, PAV does not satisfy certain
desirable axioms such as committee monotonicity.3
When EJRwas proposed it was not clear whether it can be achieved in polynomial
time. In view of this, researchers turned to designing polynomial-time algorithms to
achieve the weaker property of PJR. Brill et al. (2017a) proved that SeqPhragme´n
(an algorithm proposed by Swedish mathematician Phragme´n in the 19th century) is
polynomial-time and returns a committee satisfying PJR. Independently and around
the same time as the result by Brill et al. (2017a), Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (2016)
presented a different algorithm that finds a PJR committee and also satisfies other
desirable monotonicity axioms. Like SeqPAV, both algorithms sequentially build a
committee while optimising a corresponding load balancing objective. However the
algorithms may not return a committee that satisfies EJR.
Recently, three different groups (Aziz and Huang, 2017; Skowron et al., 2017;
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017a) have independently and around the same time
shown that a committee satisfying EJR can be computed in polynomial time.4 Two of
the groups (Aziz and Huang, 2017; Skowron et al., 2017) have essentially the same
idea of maximizing the PAV score via local search and implementing swaps of can-
didates.
4 Discussion
We focussed on proportional representation under approvals and discussed natural ax-
ioms for this purpose. It will be interesting to see how ideas from recent developments
can be used to design voting rules that are compelling for proportional representation
for dichotomous preferences as well as more general preferences. For example, it will
be interesting to design or identify rules that satisfy a strong notion of proportional
2 There is a natural dual version of SeqPAV called RevSeqPAV (in which candidates are iteratively
deleted from C that leads to minimal decrease in total PAV score) which also violates JR.
3 Committee monotonicity requires that for any outcomeW of size k, there is a possible outcomeW′ of
size k + 1 such that W′ ⊃ W.
4 Although a committee satisfying EJR can be computed in polynomial time, testing whether a given
committee satisfies a representation property is coNP-complete for both EJR (Aziz et al., 2015b, 2017a)
and PJR (Aziz and Huang, 2016).
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representation along with other natural axioms such as candidate monotonicity5 and
committee monotonicity.
When considering approvals, EJR can be further strengthened to CJR (core justi-
fied representation). Given a ballot profile (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate setC, a target
committee size k, k ≤ m, we say that a set of candidates W, |W | = k, satisfies core
representation (CJR) if there exists no coalition X ⊆ N such that |X| ≥ ℓn/k and there
is a set D ⊂ C such that |D| = ℓ and |Ai ∩D| > |Ai ∩W | for each i ∈ X. We call such a
coalition X as a CJR blocking coalition. A core concept equivalent to CJR but formal-
ized in a different way was discussed by Aziz et al. (2017a). It is interesting that core
stability, one of the central ideas of economic design is also meaningful in the context
of proportional representation. It remains open whether a committee satisfying CJR
always exists and whether such a committee can be computed in polynomial time.6
Considering that proportional representation for approvals (that capture dichoto-
mous preferences) is a non-trivial task, it leads to the question of how it should be
defined in the context of preferences that are not dichotomous. The axioms JR, PJR,
and EJR can also be extended to the case where voters have strict or weak orders
over candidates. However for a natural generalisation of JR to the case of linear or-
ders, it turns out that not only a committee satisfying the property may not exist, it
is also NP-hard to compute (Aziz et al., 2017b). It will be interesting to see if com-
pelling proportional representation axioms can be proposed for general preferences
that guide the design and analysis of rules.
There is scope for substantial and fruitful research in formalizing and achieving
proportional representation for more general or complex voting settings in which si-
multaneous or sequential decisions are made. Finally, multi-winner voting deserves
a thorough research investigation with respect to goals other than proportional repre-
sentational as well (Faliszewski et al., 2017).
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